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Abstract
We examine maximin and minimax strategies for firms in asymmetric duopoly with dif-
ferentiated goods. We consider two patterns of game; the Cournot game in which strategic
variables of the firms are their outputs, and the Bertrand game in which strategic variables
of the firms are the prices of their goods. We call two firms Firm A and B, and will show
that the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy in the Cournot game, and the max-
imin strategy and the minimax strategy in the Bertrand game are all equivalent for each
firm. However, the maximin strategy (or the minimax strategy) for Firm A and that for
Firm B are not necessarily equivalent, and they are not necessarily equivalent to their Nash
equilibrium strategies in the Cournot game nor the Bertrand game.. But, in a special case,
where the objective function of Firm B is the opposite of the objective function of Firm A,
the maximin strategy for Firm A and that for Firm B are equivalent, and they constitute
the Nash equilibrium both in the Cournot game and the Bertrand game. This special case
corresponds to relative profit maximization by the firms.
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1 Introduction
We examine maximin and minimax strategies for firms in duopoly with differentiated goods.
We consider two patterns of game; the Cournot game in which strategic variables of the firms
are their outputs, and the Bertrand game in which strategic variables of the firms are the prices
of their goods. The maximin strategy for a firm is its strategy which maximizes its objective
function that is minimized by a strategy of its rival firm. The minimax strategy for a firm
is a strategy of its rival firm which minimizes its objective function that is maximized by its
strategy. The objective functions of the firms may be or may not be their absolute profits. We
call two firms Firm A and B, and will show the following results.
(1) The maximin strategy and the minimax strategy in the Cournot game, and the maximin
strategy and the minimax strategy in the Bertrand game for Firm A are all equivalent.
(2) The maximin strategy and the minimax strategy in the Cournot game, and the maximin
strategy and the minimax strategy in the Bertrand game for Firm B are all equivalent.
However, the maximin strategy (or the minimax strategy) for Firm A and that for Firm B
are not necessarily equivalent (if the duopoly is not symmetric), and they are not necessarily
equivalent to their Nash equilibrium strategies in the Cournot game nor the Bertrand game1.
But in a special case, where the objective function of Firm B is the opposite of the objective
function of Firm A, the maximin strategy (or the minimax strategy) for Firm A and that for
Firm B are equivalent, and they constitute the Nash equilibrium both in the Cournot game
and the Bertrand game. Thus, in the special case the Nash equilibrium in the Cournot game
and that in the Bertrand game are equivalent. This special case corresponds to relative profit
maximization by the firms.
In the appendix we consider a mixed game in which one of the firms chooses the output
and the other firm chooses the price as their strategic variables, and show that the maximin
and minimax strategies for each firm in the mixed game are equivalent to those in the Cournot
game.
2 The model
There are two firms, Firm A and B. They produce differentiated goods. The outputs and the
prices of the goods are denoted by 𝑥𝐴 and 𝑝𝐴 for Firm A, and 𝑥𝐵 and 𝑝𝐵 for Firm B. The
inverse demand functions are
𝑝𝐴 = 𝑓𝐴(𝑥𝐴, 𝑥𝐵), 𝑝𝐵 = 𝑓𝐵(𝑥𝐴, 𝑥𝐵). (1)
They are continuous, differentiable and invertible. The inverses of them, that is, the direct
demand functions are written as
𝑥𝐴 = 𝑔𝐴(𝑝𝐴, 𝑝𝐵), 𝑥𝐵 = 𝑔𝐵(𝑝𝐴, 𝑝𝐵).
1If the duopoly is symmetric, the maximin strategy (or the minimax strategy) for Firm A and that for Firm B are
equivalent. But even if the duopoly is symmetric, they are not necessarily equivalent to their Nash equilibrium
strategies.
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Differentiating (1) with respect to 𝑝𝐴 given 𝑝𝐵 yields
𝜕𝑓𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐴
𝑑𝑥𝐴
𝑑𝑝𝐴
+ 𝜕𝑓𝐴𝜕𝑥𝐵
𝑑𝑥𝐵
𝑑𝑝𝐴
= 1, 𝜕𝑓𝐵𝜕𝑥𝐴
𝑑𝑥𝐴
𝑑𝑝𝐴
+ 𝜕𝑓𝐵𝜕𝑥𝐵
𝑑𝑥𝐵
𝑑𝑝𝐴
= 0.
From them we get
𝑑𝑥𝐴
𝑑𝑝𝐴
=
𝜕𝑓𝐵
𝜕𝑥𝐵
𝜕𝑓𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐴
𝜕𝑓𝐵
𝜕𝑥𝐵
− 𝜕𝑓𝐴𝜕𝑥𝐵
𝜕𝑓𝐵
𝜕𝑥𝐴
, 𝑑𝑥𝐵𝑑𝑝𝐴
= −
𝜕𝑓𝐵
𝜕𝑥𝐴
𝜕𝑓𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐴
𝜕𝑓𝐵
𝜕𝑥𝐵
− 𝜕𝑓𝐴𝜕𝑥𝐵
𝜕𝑓𝐵
𝜕𝑥𝐴
. (2)
Symmetrically,
𝑑𝑥𝐵
𝑑𝑝𝐵
=
𝜕𝑓𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐴
𝜕𝑓𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐴
𝜕𝑓𝐵
𝜕𝑥𝐵
− 𝜕𝑓𝐴𝜕𝑥𝐵
𝜕𝑓𝐵
𝜕𝑥𝐴
, 𝑑𝑥𝐴𝑑𝑝𝐵
= −
𝜕𝑓𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐵
𝜕𝑓𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐴
𝜕𝑓𝐵
𝜕𝑥𝐵
− 𝜕𝑓𝐴𝜕𝑥𝐵
𝜕𝑓𝐵
𝜕𝑥𝐴
. (3)
We assume
𝜕𝑓𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐴
≠ 0, 𝜕𝑓𝐵𝜕𝑥𝐵
≠ 0, 𝜕𝑓𝐴𝜕𝑥𝐵
≠ 0, 𝜕𝑓𝐵𝜕𝑥𝐴
≠ 0, |
𝜕𝑓𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐴
𝜕𝑓𝐵
𝜕𝑥𝐵
− 𝜕𝑓𝐴𝜕𝑥𝐵
𝜕𝑓𝐵
𝜕𝑥𝐴 |
≠ 0. (4)
The objective functions of Firm A and B are
𝜋𝐴(𝑥𝐴, 𝑥𝐵), 𝜋𝐵(𝑥𝐴, 𝑥𝐵).
They are continuous and differentiable. They may be or may not be the absolute profits of the
firms. We consider two patterns of game, the Cournot game and the Bertrand game. In the
Cournot game strategic variables of the firms are their outputs, and in the Bertrand game their
strategic variables are the prices of their goods. We do not consider simple maximization of
their objective functions. Instead we investigate maximin strategies and minimax strategies for
the firms.
3 Maximin and minimax strategies
3.1 Cournot game
3.1.1 Maximin strategy
First consider the condition for minimization of 𝜋𝐴 with respect to 𝑥𝐵. It is
𝜕𝜋𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐵
= 0. (5)
Depending on the value of 𝑥𝐴 we get the value of 𝑥𝐵 which satisfies (5). Denote it by 𝑥𝐵(𝑥𝐴).
From (5)
𝑑𝑥𝐵(𝑥𝐴)
𝑑𝑥𝐴
= −
𝜕2𝜋𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐴𝜕𝑥𝐵
𝜕2𝜋𝐴
𝜕𝑥2𝐵
.
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We assume that it is not zero. The maximin strategy for Firm A is its strategy which maximizes
𝜋𝐴(𝑥𝐴, 𝑥𝐵(𝑥𝐴)). The condition for maximization of 𝜋𝐴(𝑥𝐴, 𝑥𝐵(𝑥𝐴)) with respect to 𝑥𝐴 is
𝜕𝜋𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐴
+ 𝜕𝜋𝐴𝜕𝑥𝐵
𝑑𝑥𝐵(𝑥𝐴)
𝑑𝑥𝐴
= 0.
By (5) it is reduced to
𝜕𝜋𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐴
= 0.
Thus, the conditions for the maximin strategy for Firm A are
𝜕𝜋𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐴
= 0, 𝜕𝜋𝐴𝜕𝑥𝐵
= 0. (6)
3.1.2 Minimax strategy
Consider the condition for maximization of 𝜋𝐴 with respect to 𝑥𝐴. It is
𝜕𝜋𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐴
= 0. (7)
Depending on the value of 𝑥𝐵 we get the value of 𝑥𝐴 which satisfies (7). Denote it by 𝑥𝐴(𝑥𝐵).
From (7) we obtain
𝑑𝑥𝐴(𝑥𝐵)
𝑑𝑥𝐵
= −
𝜕2𝜋𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐵𝜕𝑥𝐴
𝜕2𝜋𝐴
𝜕𝑥2𝐴
.
We assume that it is not zero. The minimax strategy for Firm A is a strategy of Firm B which
minimizes 𝜋𝐴(𝑥𝐴(𝑥𝐵), 𝑥𝐵). The condition for minimization of 𝜋𝐴(𝑥𝐴(𝑥𝐵), 𝑥𝐵) with respect to
𝑥𝐵 is
𝜕𝜋𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐴
𝑑𝑥𝐴(𝑥𝐵)
𝑑𝑥𝐵
+ 𝜕𝜋𝐴𝜕𝑥𝐵
= 0.
By (7) it is reduced to
𝜕𝜋𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐵
= 0.
Thus, the conditions for the maximin strategy for Firm A are
𝜕𝜋𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐴
= 0, 𝜕𝜋𝐴𝜕𝑥𝐵
= 0.
They are the same as conditions in (6). Similarly, we can show that the conditions for the
maximin strategy and the minimax strategy for Firm B are
𝜕𝜋𝐵
𝜕𝑥𝐵
= 0, 𝜕𝜋𝐵𝜕𝑥𝐴
= 0. (8)
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3.2 Bertrand game
The objective functions of Firm A and B in the Bertrand game are written as follows.
𝜋𝐴(𝑥𝐴(𝑝𝐴, 𝑝𝐵), 𝑥𝐵(𝑝𝐴, 𝑝𝐵)), 𝜋𝐵(𝑥𝐴(𝑝𝐴, 𝑝𝐵), 𝑥𝐵(𝑝𝐴, 𝑝𝐵)).
We can write them as
𝜋𝐴(𝑝𝐴, 𝑝𝐵), 𝜋𝐵(𝑝𝐴, 𝑝𝐵),
because 𝜋𝐴(𝑥𝐴(𝑝𝐴, 𝑝𝐵), 𝑥𝐵(𝑝𝐴, 𝑝𝐵)) and 𝜋𝐵(𝑥𝐴(𝑝𝐴, 𝑝𝐵), 𝑥𝐵(𝑝𝐴, 𝑝𝐵)) are functions of 𝑝𝐴 and
𝑝𝐵. Exchanging 𝑥𝐴 and 𝑥𝐵 by 𝑝𝐴 and 𝑝𝐵 in the arguments in the previous subsection, we can
show that the conditions for the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy for Firm A in the
Bertrand game are as follows.
𝜕𝜋𝐴
𝜕𝑝𝐴
= 0, 𝜕𝜋𝐴𝜕𝑝𝐵
= 0. (9)
We can rewrite them as follows.
𝜕𝜋𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐴
𝑑𝑥𝐴
𝑑𝑝𝐴
+ 𝜕𝜋𝐴𝜕𝑥𝐵
𝑑𝑥𝐵
𝑑𝑝𝐴
= 0, 𝜕𝜋𝐴𝜕𝑥𝐴
𝑑𝑥𝐴
𝑑𝑝𝐵
+ 𝜕𝜋𝐴𝜕𝑥𝐵
𝑑𝑥𝐵
𝑑𝑝𝐵
= 0.
By (2) and (3) and the assumptions in (4), they are further rewritten as
𝜕𝜋𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐴
𝜕𝑓𝐵
𝜕𝑥𝐵
− 𝜕𝜋𝐴𝜕𝑥𝐵
𝜕𝑓𝐵
𝜕𝑥𝐴
= 0, 𝜕𝜋𝐴𝜕𝑥𝐴
𝜕𝑓𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐵
− 𝜕𝜋𝐴𝜕𝑥𝐵
𝜕𝑓𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐴
= 0.
Again by the assumptions in (4), we obtain
𝜕𝜋𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐴
= 0, 𝜕𝜋𝐴𝜕𝑥𝐵
= 0.
They are the same as conditions in (6).
The conditions for the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy for Firm B in the Bertrand
game are
𝜕𝜋𝐵
𝜕𝑝𝐵
= 0, 𝜕𝜋𝐵𝜕𝑝𝐴
= 0.
They are rewritten as
𝜕𝜋𝐵
𝜕𝑥𝐵
𝑑𝑥𝐵
𝑑𝑝𝐵
+ 𝜕𝜋𝐵𝜕𝑥𝐴
𝑑𝑥𝐴
𝑑𝑝𝐵
= 0, 𝜕𝜋𝐵𝜕𝑥𝐵
𝑑𝑥𝐵
𝑑𝑝𝐴
+ 𝜕𝜋𝐵𝜕𝑥𝐴
𝑑𝑥𝐴
𝑑𝑝𝐴
= 0.
By (2) and (3) and the assumptions in (4), they are further rewritten as
𝜕𝜋𝐵
𝜕𝑥𝐵
𝜕𝑓𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐴
− 𝜕𝜋𝐵𝜕𝑥𝐴
𝜕𝑓𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐵
= 0, 𝜕𝜋𝐵𝜕𝑥𝐵
𝜕𝑓𝐵
𝜕𝑥𝐴
− 𝜕𝜋𝐵𝜕𝑥𝐴
𝜕𝑓𝐵
𝜕𝑥𝐵
= 0.
Again by the assumptions in (4), we obtain
𝜕𝜋𝐵
𝜕𝑥𝐴
= 0, 𝜕𝜋𝐵𝜕𝑥𝐵
= 0.
They are the same as conditions in (8). We have proved the following proposition.
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Proposition 1. (1) The maximin strategy and the minimax strategy in the Cournot game,
and the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy in the Bertrand game for Firm A are
all equivalent.
(2) The maximin strategy and the minimax strategy in the Cournot game, and the maximin
strategy and the minimax strategy in the Bertrand game for Firm B are all equivalent.
4 Special case
The results in the previous section do not imply that the maximin strategy (or the minimax
strategy) for Firm A and that for Firm B are equivalent (if the duopoly is not symmetric), and
they are equivalent to their Nash equilibrium strategies in the Cournot game nor the Bertrand
game. But in a special case the maximin strategy (or the minimax strategy) for Firm A and
that for Firm B are equivalent, and they constitute the Nash equilibrium both in the Cournot
game and the Bertrand game.
The conditions for the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy for Firm A are
𝜕𝜋𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐴
= 0, 𝜕𝜋𝐴𝜕𝑥𝐵
= 0. (6)
Those for Firm B are
𝜕𝜋𝐵
𝜕𝑥𝐵
= 0, 𝜕𝜋𝐵𝜕𝑥𝐴
= 0. (8)
(6) and (8) are not necessarily equivalent. The conditions for Nash equilibrium in the Cournot
game are
𝜕𝜋𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐴
= 0, 𝜕𝜋𝐵𝜕𝑥𝐵
= 0. (10)
(6) and (10) are not necessarily equivalent. The conditions for Nash equilibrium in the Bertrand
game are
𝜕𝜋𝐴
𝜕𝑝𝐴
= 0, 𝜕𝜋𝐵𝜕𝑝𝐵
= 0. (11)
(9) and (11) are not necessarily equivalent.
However, in a special case those conditions are all equivalent. We assume
𝜋𝐵 = −𝜋𝐴 or 𝜋𝐴 + 𝜋𝐵 = 0. (12)
Then, (8) is rewritten as
𝜕𝜋𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐵
= 0, 𝜕𝜋𝐴𝜕𝑥𝐴
= 0. (13)
They are equivalent to (6). Therefore, the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy for Firm
A and those for Firm B are equivalent. 𝜕𝜋𝐵𝜕𝑥𝐴 = 0 and
𝜕𝜋𝐵
𝜕𝑥𝐵
= 0 in (8) mean, respectively,
minimization of 𝜋𝐵 with respect to 𝑥𝐴 and maximization of 𝜋𝐵 with respect to 𝑥𝐵. On the
other hand, 𝜕𝜋𝐴𝜕𝑥𝐴 = 0 and
𝜕𝜋𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐵
= 0 in (6) and (13) mean, respectively, maximization of 𝜋𝐴 with
respect to 𝑥𝐴 and minimization of 𝜋𝐴 with respect to 𝑥𝐵.
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(10) is rewritten as
𝜕𝜋𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐴
= 0, 𝜕𝜋𝐴𝜕𝑥𝐵
= 0. (14)
(14) and (6) are equivalent. Therefore, the maximin strategy (Firm A’s strategy) and the min-
imax strategy (Firm B’s strategy) for Firm A constitute the Nash equilibrium of the Cournot
game. 𝜕𝜋𝐵𝜕𝑥𝐵 = 0 in (10) means maximization of 𝜋𝐵 with respect to 𝑥𝐵. On the other hand,
𝜕𝜋𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐵
= 0 in (14) means minimization of 𝜋𝐴 with respect to 𝑥𝐵.
(11) is rewritten as
𝜕𝜋𝐴
𝜕𝑝𝐴
= 0, 𝜕𝜋𝐴𝜕𝑝𝐵
= 0. (15)
(15) and (9) are equivalent. Therefore, the maximin strategy (Firm A’s strategy) and the mini-
max strategy (Firm B’s strategy) for Firm A in the Bertrand game constitute the Nash equilib-
rium of the Bertrand game. Since the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy for Firm A
in the Cournot game and those in the Bertrand game are equivalent, the Nash equilibrium of
the Cournot game and that of the Bertrand game are equivalent.
Summarizing the results, we get the following proposition.
Proposition 2. In the special case in which (12) is satisfied:
(1) The maximin strategy and the minimax strategy in the Cournot game and the Bertrand
game for Firm A and the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy in the Cournot game
and the Bertrand game for Firm B are equivalent.
(2) Thesemaximin andminimax strategies constitute the Nash equilibrium both in the Cournot
game and the Bertrand game.
This special case corresponds to relative profit maximization2. Let ̄𝜋𝐴 and ̄𝜋𝐵 be the absolute
profits of Firm A and B, and denote their relative profits by 𝜋𝐴 and 𝜋𝐵. Then,
𝜋𝐴 = ̄𝜋𝐴 − ̄𝜋𝐵, 𝜋𝐵 = ̄𝜋𝐵 − ̄𝜋𝐴.
From them we can see
𝜋𝐵 = −𝜋𝐴.
5 Concluding Remark
We have analyzed maximin and minimax strategies in Cournot and Bertrand games in duopoly.
We assumed differentiability of objective functions of firms. In the future research we want to
extend arguments of this paper to a case where we do not postulate differentiability of objective
functions3 and to a case of symmetric oligopoly with more than two firms.
2About relative profit maximization under imperfect competition please see Matsumura, Matsushima and Cato
(2013), Satoh and Tanaka (2013), Satoh and Tanaka (2014a), Satoh and Tanaka (2014b), Tanaka (2013a),
Tanaka (2013b) and Vega-Redondo (1997).
3One attempt along this line is Satoh and Tanaka (2016).
7
Appendix: Mixed game
We consider a case where Firm A’s strategic variable is 𝑝𝐴, and that of Firm B is 𝑥𝐵.
Differentiating (1) with respect to 𝑝𝐴 given 𝑥𝐵 yields
𝜕𝑓𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐴
𝑑𝑥𝐴
𝑑𝑝𝐴
= 1, 𝜕𝑓𝐵𝜕𝑥𝐴
𝑑𝑥𝐴
𝑑𝑝𝐴
= 𝑑𝑝𝐵𝑑𝑝𝐴
.
Differentiating (1) with respect to 𝑥𝐵 given 𝑝𝐴 yields
𝜕𝑓𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐴
𝑑𝑥𝐴
𝑑𝑥𝐵
+ 𝜕𝑓𝐴𝜕𝑥𝐵
= 0, 𝜕𝑓𝐵𝜕𝑥𝐴
𝑑𝑥𝐴
𝑑𝑥𝐵
+ 𝜕𝑓𝐵𝜕𝑥𝐵
= 𝑑𝑝𝐵𝑑𝑥𝐵
.
From them we obtain
𝑑𝑥𝐴
𝑑𝑝𝐴
= 1𝜕𝑓𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐴
, 𝑑𝑝𝐵𝑑𝑝𝐴
=
𝜕𝑓𝐵
𝜕𝑥𝐴
𝜕𝑓𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐴
, 𝑑𝑥𝐴𝑑𝑥𝐵
= −
𝜕𝑓𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐵
𝜕𝑓𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐴
, 𝑑𝑝𝐵𝑑𝑥𝐵
=
𝜕𝑓𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐴
𝜕𝑓𝐵
𝜕𝑥𝐵
− 𝜕𝑓𝐵𝜕𝑥𝐴
𝜕𝑓𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐵
𝜕𝑓𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐴
.
We assume 𝑑𝑥𝐴𝑑𝑝𝐴 ≠ 0 and
𝜕𝑓𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐵
≠ 0, and so 𝑑𝑥𝐴𝑑𝑥𝐵 ≠ 0.
We write the objective functions of Firm A and B as follows.
𝜑𝐴(𝑝𝐴, 𝑥𝐵) = 𝜋𝐴(𝑥𝐴(𝑝𝐴, 𝑝𝐵), 𝑥𝐵), 𝜑𝐵(𝑝𝐴, 𝑥𝐵) = 𝜋𝐵(𝑥𝐴(𝑝𝐴, 𝑝𝐵), 𝑥𝐵).
Then,
⎧⎪
⎨
⎪⎩
𝜕𝜑𝐴
𝜕𝑝𝐴
= 𝜕𝜋𝐴𝜕𝑥𝐴
𝑑𝑥𝐴
𝑑𝑝𝐴
, 𝜕𝜑𝐴𝜕𝑥𝐵 =
𝜕𝜋𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐴
𝑑𝑥𝐴
𝑑𝑥𝐵
+ 𝜕𝜋𝐴𝜕𝑥𝐵 ,
𝜕𝜑𝐵
𝜕𝑝𝐴
= 𝜕𝜋𝐵𝜕𝑥𝐴
𝑑𝑥𝐴
𝑑𝑝𝐴
, 𝜕𝜑𝐵𝜕𝑥𝐵 =
𝜕𝜋𝐵
𝜕𝑥𝐴
𝑑𝑥𝐴
𝑑𝑥𝐵
+ 𝜕𝜋𝐵𝜕𝑥𝐵 .
(16)
By similar ways to arguments in Section 3, we can show that for Firm A the conditions for the
maximin strategy and the conditions for the minimax strategy are equivalent, and they are
𝜕𝜑𝐴
𝜕𝑝𝐴
= 0, 𝜕𝜑𝐴𝜕𝑥𝐵
= 0. (17)
For Firm B the conditions for the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy are
𝜕𝜑𝐴
𝜕𝑝𝐴
= 0, 𝜕𝜑𝐴𝜕𝑥𝐵
= 0. (18)
By (16), (17) is rewritten as
𝜕𝜋𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐴
𝑑𝑥𝐴
𝑑𝑝𝐴
= 0, 𝜕𝜋𝐴𝜕𝑥𝐴
𝑑𝑥𝐴
𝑑𝑥𝐵
+ 𝜕𝜋𝐴𝜕𝑥𝐵
= 0.
Similarly, (18) is rewritten as follows.
𝜕𝜋𝐵
𝜕𝑥𝐴
𝑑𝑥𝐴
𝑑𝑝𝐴
= 0, 𝜕𝜋𝐵𝜕𝑥𝐴
𝑑𝑥𝐴
𝑑𝑥𝐵
+ 𝜕𝜋𝐵𝜕𝑥𝐵
= 0.
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By the assumption 𝑑𝑥𝐴𝑑𝑝𝐴 ≠ 0 and
𝑑𝑥𝐴
𝑑𝑥𝐵
≠ 0, we obtain
𝜕𝜋𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐴
= 0, 𝜕𝜋𝐴𝜕𝑥𝐵
= 0,
and
𝜕𝜋𝐵
𝜕𝑥𝐴
= 0, 𝜕𝜋𝐵𝜕𝑥𝐵
= 0.
They are the same as the conditions for the maximin and minimax strategies for Firm A and B
in the Cournot game. Therefore, the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy for each firm
in the mixed game are equivalent to those in the Cournot game.
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